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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to identify, describe, analyze 
and offer alternatives to the current missile alert load 
scheduling system at the 341st Strategic Missile Wing, Malmstrom 
Air Force Base, Montana. The scheduling system, which is in use 
at the time of this writing, is seen to be the cause of a morale 
problem by missile combat crew members assigned to alert duties 
at this wing. The problem under question stems from the fact 
that the 341st covers a vast amount of area and there are 
presently inequities due to the disproportionate distances which 
are traveled by crew members assigned to the more distant sites. 
All crews depart the base at the same time daily for their 
24-hour alert tour. Work centers vary in distance from the base 
and the associated driving times, one way, cover a broad range 
from 45 minutes to three hours. Considering the time required 
for alert changeover and round trip driving time, crews 
returning from alert can arrive home by 11:00 a.m. or as late as 
3:00 p.m. Besides the obvious fatigue, there is a definite 
frustration involved for distant alert crews as they get home to 
find the majority of the business day gone 1 For the same credit 
of one alert tour, the crews assigned to more distant sites lose
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
much more free time. In fact» over a one month period the extra 
driving time amounts to about 24 hours - the equivalent of 
another alert. The need for this study is therefore apparent 
and will be the driving force behind the search for equitable 
alternatives to the present system.
In general the study describes the current system and 
analyzes its equity as perceived by crewmembers. Alternatives 
have been proposed to counter perceived morale problems in light 
of budget constraints. Finally, an optimal solution has been 
found based upon a survey which has been conducted on the 
various alternatives. An economic feasibility forecast of each 
of the proposed options along with a statistical analysis of the 
survey are presented. The results of this study will be 
forwarded to the base scheduling office, the affected operations 
squadrons, the Director of Operations and the Wing Commander.
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CHAPTER II 
RELATED RESEARCH
Previous research has been conducted by University of 
Montana students into related areas of research. A professional 
paper was presented by Norman Dollhopf in 1977 concerning the 
transportation of launch control facility managers and cooks at 
Malmstrom.^ The problem was to arrive at a time-saving method 
for the transport of support personnel working extended tours of 
three to four days in the missile complex. The solution to this 
transportation problem was reached by using applications from 
linear programming models.^ In addition^ a study was conducted 
by Dennis Ellerbeck, another University of Montana student, on 
site security changeover transportation methods. The outcome of 
this study proposed a transportation method based on using 15 
passenger carry-alls designed to save the wing over 9100,OOG in 
terms of both vehicle and man-hour costs.
More related to the subject at hand are recent alert load 
studies which have been conducted by University of Southern 
California students at Malmstrom Air Force Base (AFB).^’  ̂ These 
studies separately recommended the use of increased manning and 
smaller squadrons to solve the alert load inequity dilemma. 
Finally, missile combat crew members themselves have attempted
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
to propose alternatives to the current scheduling system from 
within via wing staff summary projects. One such study was 
conducted by Preston B. Carwlle and the author of this study, 
both from the 490th Strategic Missile Squadron at Malmstrom AFB. 
Their cost/benefit analysis of the 48 hour alert concept 
proposed a total annual savings of approximately S163,500 while 
attempting to alleviate the burdensome schedules of the crews 
assigned to distant sites. This study will consider, 
consolidate, and research similar and original alert load 
scheduling alternatives In order to propose an optimal solution 
to the problem.
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CHAPTER III
A BACKGROUND TO STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND MISSILE DUTY
Before discussing the issue of missile combat crew alert 
loads, a brief description of both the Minuteman Weapon System 
and the missile combat crew member is required to provide the 
necessary background for problem analysis. In addition, the 
mission of the system as a whole must be explained to give the 
"big picture."
MINUTEMAN_MSSILES_AT_MALMSTRQM
Ibg_WsaB9D_Sygtems
The 341st Strategic Missile Wing (SMW) currently deploys 
two major weapon systems: the Minuteman II and the Minuteman
III Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The major difference 
between these missiles is the fact that the Minuteman III 
employs a Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle 
(MIRV) design which gives the missile the capability of hitting 
up to three different targets.^ The Minuteman II missile is 
currently capable of hitting only one target. Both the
Minuteman II and the Minuteman III missiles are maintained on
5
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alert in underground, hardened, unmanned launch facilities 
<LFs>.^ The LF is a minimum of three miles from other launch 
facilities and the manned launch control center (LCC). A 
missile squadron consists of fifty LFs and five LCCs, all 
connected by a buried cable network. Each LCC continually 
monitors ten missiles in its own flight and has the capability 
to control, monitor and launch all fifty missiles in the 
squadron.
The principal system components at the launch control 
facility include the launch control center (LCC> and the launch 
control soft support building (LCSB). The LCC contains all of 
the equipment the two-officer crew needs to control and monitor 
the missile launch facilities. Each LCC is separated by a 
minimum of fourteen miles and is buried to a depth of forty to 
one hundred feet below grade. The LCSB contains living quarters 
and support equipment for all topside personnel.^ The launch 
control facility, as a whole, is manned by a missile combat 
crew, a facility manager, cook, and six security policemen. 
Figure 1 shows how a typical launch control facility is laid 
out.
WeaBgn_System_DeBloyment
There are presently six Minuteman bases within the 
Strategic Air Command (SAC): Malmstrom AFB near Great Falls,
Montana ; Minot AFB, near Minot, North Dakota; Grand Forks AFB,
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near Grand Forks, North Dakota; Ellsworth AFB, near Rapid City, 
South Dakota; Francis E. Warren AFB, near Cheyenne, Wyoming and 
Whiteman AFB, near Knob Noster, Missouri.^
The 341st Strategic Missile Wing (SMW) at Malmstrom AFB, 
Montana, continually deploys personnel at each of Its twenty 
underground launch control centers. The 341st SMW Is the 
largest ICBM complex In the free world covering approximately 
23,OOO square miles In Montana. The wing Is organized Into four 
geographically separated squadrons: the 10th, 12th, 490th, and
564th Strategic Missile Squadrons (SMSs). Figure 2 displays 
them as squadrons I, II, III, and IV respectively. The lOth SMS 
and 490th SMS are deployed south east of the base, while the 
12th SMS and the 564th lie north and to the west.
Each squadron Is composed of five flights. A flight Is an 
Integral unit consisting of ten launch facilities and one launch 
control center. Therefore, each squadron will possess fifty 
missiles and five launch control centers. One of those five 
launch control centers Is designed to be a Squadron Command Post 
(SCP) and Is In charge of that particular squadron. ^^ It 
should be noted for future reference, that a squadron, like a 
flight. Is also an Integral unit and cannot be reorganized 
because of the original electrical connectivity designed Into 
the system.
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IHE_MISSILE_ÇOMBAT_ÇREW_MEMBER
Strategic Air Command (SAC) missile combat crew members are 
highly trained and dedicated professionals who work In one of 
the most critical career fields In the Air Force. After 
extensive training In a particular weapon system, they are 
assigned as members of missile combat crews. A Minuteman crew 
Is composed of two officers with about 85 percent of new missile 
officers being recently commissioned second lieutenants.  ̂̂
Due to the critical responsibilities associated with 
missile crew duty, extreme caution must be exercised to ensure 
that only reliable, trustworthy Individuals are assigned to be 
crew members. Therefore, all missile crew members are subject 
to the requirements of the Personnel Reliability Program <PRP). 
The purpose of PRP Is to provide for the selection and continual 
evaluation of personnel to determine their emotional stability 
and reliability. Through this program, the Air Force attempts 
to reduce the possibility of unauthorized personnel actions that 
may affect the reliability or performance of our nuclear weapon
systems. It Is also designed to provide optimum safeguards
12 13against nuclear disasters. ' This program, due to Its 
stringent safety and reliability requirements, has a definite 
Impact on any scheduling alternatives that are considered In 
this study.
Missile crew members serve a four-year tour which begins at 
the wing when the Individual Is mission ready. The Initial
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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assignment, for officer crev members is as a deputy missile 
combat crew commander on a regular line crew. During this 
period these crew members may progress to a flight commander 
deputy or possibly to an instructor or evaluator crew. A deputy 
missile combat crew commander (DMCCC> is eligible for upgrading 
to the position of missile combat crew commander (MCCC) at the 
discretion of the wing senior staff. In this position they may 
command a regular line crew, an instructor crew or an evaluator 
crew. In addition, one may be appointed as a flight commander. 
These various positions will appear again in this writing when 
the survey instrument is examined.
Minuteman crews are assigned 24-hour alert tours. Line 
crews usually have eight alerts a month. Flight commanders and 
flight commander deputies average four to five alerts per month. 
Instructor and evaluator crews average only two alerts per 
month. During these tours, minimum rest/sleep periods are 
approximately four to six hours in duration. The remainder of 
the tour is devoted to weapon system inspections, as well as 
maintenance and security procedures.
In addition to alert duties, a crew member completes an 
average of 15 hours of training per month, including weapon 
system operations training, codes training, practice sessions in 
the missile procedures trainer (MPT), proficiency training, and 
a host of other miscellaneous requirements. Many crew members 
are also involved in a masters degree program which usually 
takes a full day out of his week, not to mention preparation
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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time. Crew members are also expected to complete a 
correspondence course for professional military education 
requirements. Launch officers are required to perform at least 
one or two additional duties at the squadron level and possibly 
participate or coordinate wing activities as well. All in all, 
the average crew member can be an extremely busy individual.  ̂̂
î h e _m i s s i o n
The man and the machine have been introduced. But one must 
look at the mission of both along with other selected support 
missions before the problem can be defined adequately. The 
mission of the Minuteman weapon system is to deliver 
thermonuclear warheads against strategic targets from hardened 
underground launchers in the continental United States. ^^ The 
mission of each alert crew is clearly defined as well: to be
prepared, 24 hours a day, upon receipt of valid orders initiated 
by the President of the United States, to launch one or more 
intercontinental ballistic missiles against enemy targets.  ̂̂
The man and the machine do not operate in a vacuum. There 
are a variety of agencies which help them accomplish their 
primary mission of deterrence. One such agency in particular, 
which is referred to throughout the paper is the Operations, 
Plans and Scheduling Branch (DOTS). This branch is responsible 
for scheduling and/or establishing missile combat crew alert 
duty requirements. They will schedule taskings in accordance
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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with mlBsion priorities, namely : primary alert reeponeibilities
first, required training second, and all other tasks required to
support other primary alert requirements will be considered
17 18next. ' The various constraints that scheduling faces in
accomplishing its mission will be examined in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV
THE PROBLEM
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
The 341st Strategic Missile Wing (341 SMW), as pointed out, 
is the largest missile complex in the free world. Due to the 
vast expansiveness of the complex, operations crews at this wing
drive longer distances than any other crews in SAC in order to
19perform a similar mission. Because of this fact, a possible
morale problem exists with many missile combat crew members 
(MCCMs). The problem here seems to be associated mainly with 
those MCCMs who perform alert duties at the farther launch 
control centers within the wing. The probable cause of this 
stems from the fact that MCCMs having to travel to far sites 
feel that they work many more hours (due to driving time) than 
those MCCMs assigned to near sites. From a cursory glance, this 
may seem like a trivial complaint, but when examined closer one 
can clearly see the obvious difference in alert mileage. Figure 
3 depicts round trip distances traveled by crews assigned to 
each of the ILCS (Improved Launch Control System) sites, which 
are AOl through OOl. These sites encompass the 10th, 12th, and
490th Strategic Missile Squadrons (SMSs). The 564th SMS
14
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Includes sites POl through TOI. Due to the fact that the 564th 
runs a completely different and separate weapon system called 
the Command Data Buffer (CDB) system, their sites must be manned 
by CDB trained crew members capable of dealing with the 
Minuteman III missiles deployed solely in their squadron. This, 
therefore, places them in their own CDB peculiar scheduling 
system, whereas the scheduling system for ILCS will affect the 
10th, 12th, and 490th SMSs only. The 564th SMS will
consequently not be included in this study.
The problem then is that not all MCCMs work equal hours due 
to driving times as actual alert duty is 24 hours regardless of 
the site location. There is some amount of distress caused when 
crews return from alert late in the afternoon. Arriving too 
late in the business day for most transactions, they feel as 
though they have "lost a day." As a result, those MCCMs working 
longer hours are more fatigued and frustrated, creating a morale 
problem. An example of this is frequently demonstrated when 
crews who are assigned to distant sites return at 3 100 p.m. on 
their assigned education day. These individuals may have barely 
enough time to shave and shower before they must be at a 4:30 
p. m. class whereas the individual assigned to a close site may 
have already spent the majority of the day studying for the 
afternoon examination.
Morale problems can have serious repercussions on 
productivity as well. Because of the long distances between the 
support base and the launch control center <LCC>, much of a crew
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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member's productive work hours are spent in transit going to and 
from alert. While it is evident that the Job entails various 
amounts of activities that support the actual mission, the time 
spent enroute in support of alert requirements is excessive. 
Decreasing driving time may lead to more productivity by 
allowing crew members to channel their efforts more toward the 
primary Job, and not toward the road. Another incidental 
benefit in the reduction of driving times would be a 
corresponding decrease in accident rates caused by travel 
fatigue. This study does not attempt to prove that productivity 
is lower for crew members assigned to far sites ss this would be 
a thesis within itself. But certainly those assigned to distant 
sites have less time available no matter what the endeavor, 
whether it be to study, to work on additional duties or Just to 
relax and enjoy the family. Having identified the problem as a 
morale deficiency due to a shortage of available "quality time," 
a more detailed description is necessary.
PR0BLEï1_DgSÇRIPÎI0H
Existing conditions provide for all MCCMs to depart base at 
approximately 8:30 a.m. for different launch control centers, 
driving similar vehicles. Alert crews arrive at their 
respective sites at different times depending on the site's 
distance from base. Table 1 depicts times and driving distances 
for each of the Minuteman II ILCS sites. After arrival at the
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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TABLE 1
MISSILE COMBAT CREW ALERT DISTANCES AND TIMES
SITE FROM BASE 
TO : (Miles >
ONE WAY 
(Hrs/Mins)
ROUND TRIP 
(Miles)
ROUND TR 
(Hrs/Min
1 AOl 27. 3 : 35 54. 6 1 : 10
0 BOl 50. 7 1 :08 101. 4 2: 16
s COl 64. 1 1 :21 128. 2 2: 42
M DOl 98. 4 2: 08 196. 8 4: 16
s EOl 135. 0 2:53 270. 0 5:46
1 FOl 57. 3 1:30 114. 6 3:00
2 GOl 51. a 1 : 12 103. 6 2:24
S HOI 47. 3 1 :06 94. 6 2:12
M 101 50. 8 1 : 17 101. 6 2:34
S JOl 40. 3 :57 80. 6 1:54
4 KOI 123. 2 2:32 246. 4 5 :04
9 LOI 103. 1 2:04 206. 2 4 : 08
0 MOl 93. 6 1:53 187. 2 3 : 46
T NOl 121. 0 2:32 242. 0 4 : 04
H 001 138. 8 2 : 54 277. 6 5:48
Source: 341st. SMW, Surface Travel Time and Mileage Chart.
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1 9
launch control center, there Is about a 45 minute delay for crew 
changeover procedures before the off-going crew can depart for 
the Malmstrom support base. As seen in Table 2, crews assigned 
to "close" sites may return to base as early as 10:40 a.m., 
whereas those assigned to "far" sites return to base as late as 
3:00 p.m. A "far" site was determined based on ability to take 
advantage of remaining daylight hours upon return from alert.
The average return time for wing alert crews is 12:57 p.m. 
Assuming typical lunch hours, ranging from 11:00 a.m. to 1:00 
p. m., approximately half of the business day is available, if 
the crew returns to base by 1:00 p.m. For the purposes of this 
study then, a "far" site will be defined as a site from which an 
MCCM returns to base later than 1:00 p.m., typically DOl, EOl, 
KOI, LOI, MOl, NOl, and OOl (see Figure 4). Close sites then, 
are ones from which crews usually return before 1:00 p .m.20
In the long run, the extra driving hours add up 
significantly. Figure 5 depicts this fact very clearly. Based 
on alert schedules for the past year, in a month's time the 
extra driving hours add up to about 24 hours per "far site"
crew, the equivalent of an extra alert each month. Figure 6
shows an even more dramatic picture as it shows the extra 
mileage amassed each year by the "far site" crews in comparison 
to those closer in.
It is important to note that the objective of the
scheduling system is to man the wing's missile sites
continuously, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Factors such as
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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TABLE 2
MISSILE COMBAT CREW ALERT DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL TIMES
SITE DEPART
BASE
ARRIVE
SITE
CHANGE
OVER
LEAVE
SITE
ARRIV;
BASE
1 AGI 08:30 09:05 1 :00 10:05 10:40
0 BOl 08: 30 09:38 0:45 10:23 11:31
s CGI 08: 30 09:51 0:45 10:36 11 ; 57
M DOl 08:30 10:38 0: 45 11:23 13:31
S EOl 08:30 11 :23 0:45 12:08 15:01
1 FOl 08:30 10:00 0:45 10:45 12; 15
2 GOl 08: 30 09:42 1 :00 10:42 11: 54
S HOI 08: 30 09:36 0:45 10:36 11 : 42
M 101 08: 30 09:47 0:45 10:32 11:49
S JOl 08:30 09:27 0:45 10:02 10:59
4 KOI 08:30 11:02 1 :00 12:02 14:34
9 LOI 08: 30 10:34 0: 45 11 : 19 13: 23
0 MOl 08:30 10:23 0:45 11 :08 13: 01
T NOl 08: 30 11:02 0:45 11 :47 14: 19
H 001 08:30 11:26 0 ; 45 12; 11 15:05
purce : 341st SMW, Surface Travel Time _and_Mileage_Ch
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leave, TDY (temporary duty). Illness, training and other varied 
and unpredictable requirements may cause a fluctuation in the 
overall work load but they were not considered in this study. 
Doing so will not bear on the overall averages in an adverse 
manner.
The overall objective of this study is to propose 
alternative solutions in order to make time at work, i.e. away 
from home, equitable among the three ILCS missile squadrons, 
thus raising the overall morale with possible benefits in terms 
of productivity as well. This equilibrium certainly does not 
exist today as can be readily seen by looking at Figure 7.
Alert duties last 24 hours regardless of the site location. 
Since changeover times are also basically constant, the 
objective is simply to reduce travel time for distant sites or 
otherwise compensate for that extra burden.
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CHAPTER V 
THE CONSTRAINTS/CRITERIA
For any proposed system to be viable, it must be weighed 
against set constraints and predetermined requirements. Without 
these boundaries and goals any options would be extremely 
difficult to appraise. This study examines four main bodies of 
constraints to include: political, economic, psychological, as
well as scheduling criteria.
PQLITIÇAL_ÇQNSTRAINTS
This analysis assumes that United States foreign policy 
will not change drastically in the next 20 years. Foreign 
policy in part must be a reaction to what adversaries hope to 
accomplish with their own policies. Nuclear strength is, and 
will continue to be a key element in enabling Soviets to attain 
their national policy objectives. In response to this threat, 
the United States' goals are to maintain a flexible strategy and 
sufficient combat capability to deter the Soviets and thereby 
deny them any plausible opportunity for achieving their 
political and military objectives. In other words, the strategy
must preclude any Soviet perception that they could successfully
26
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attack the United States or its allies. SAC has the principal 
and fundamental responsibility to provide this nation with a
nuclear combat capability strong enough to make deterrence a
2 1reality. Hence the Minuteman Weapon System, as a part of our
nuclear strategy, will probably continue to perform its mission 
into the next century. It is further assumed that technological 
advances may modify, but will not eliminate, the Minuteman 
concept in the near future. Thus, the political criteria call 
for SAC to provide continuous manning for the Minuteman system 
in accordance with current policy guidelines.
ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS
All proposed alternatives must remain within the 
constraints of the current SAC operating budget. This 
constraint, like the political one, is external in nature. The 
Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command does not decide 
how large SAC's budget should be. He does, however, have a 
limited capability to rearrange the budget in his command as 
long as national policies are supported. The fact stands that 
the Minuteman family of ICBMs has been the heart and backbone of 
U.S. strategic deterrence for more than twenty-four years. SAC 
certainly will not abandon its efforts to support Minuteman, but 
other operating and future systems are achieving ever increasing
attention and funding to support the President's Strategic Force
2 2Modernization Program. The "big picture" is therefore complex
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and highly stressed in terms of excess capacity for present and 
future fundings. Hence, in a very real sense, a budget increase 
at Malmstrom would necessarily mean a budget cut elsewhere. It 
is then a necessity and constraint of this study that any 
proposed solution have a minimal impact on current operating 
costs, avoiding a shifting of funds away from current strategic 
priorities. In this harsh economic environment almost any 
budget increase would adversely impact the present strategic mix 
in the budget.
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS
As described earlier, the Personnel Reliability Program 
(PRP) can have a major impact on the viability of any proposed 
alternatives. Each missile combat crew member (MCCM) is 
certified under a critical position as a part of this program.
As such, these individuals are subject to constant psychological 
monitoring by themselves, their peers and their supervisors. If 
factors exist to make an individual suspect under the 
requirements of PRP, that individual can be temporarily or 
permanently removed from alert duties. In cases of doubt 
further medical evaluation is usually advised. One can
conjecture that alternatives to the present scheduling system 
may involve changes in one or more of these factors. Thus, any 
possible adverse psychological effects of implementing 
alternatives must be weighed and be considered as an important
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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constraint in finding an optimal solution. This rather 
subjective criterion was addressed, at least in part, by the 
survey. Attitudes toward the various possible alternatives were 
solicited and are to be examined in the comparative analysis 
portion of this study.
SÇHEDyLING.ÇQNSÎRAINTS
In terms of scheduling, there are a variety of constraints 
which must be met at both the SAC and unit levels. As pointed 
out earlier, SAC dictates that scheduling of missile crews will 
follow certain priorities to include, first and foremost, the 
continual manning of alert facilities, followed by required 
training and then by other tasks required to support the alert 
functions. SAC further limits scheduling activities by not 
allowing the scheduling of crew members for duty/training twelve 
hours prior to alert departure. In addition, SAC states that 
back to back alert tours will not be scheduled unless requested 
in writing by the crew member and approved by the squadron 
commander. A "back to back” takes place when a crew arrives 
back on the support base from alert duties and dispatches 
immediately back to the field the following day. SAC's desired 
rest/sleep period is six hours during each 24-hour alert duty 
tour. Finally, SAC requires that the squadron command posts 
(SCPs), one in each squadron, be manned with specially trained 
SCP crews.
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Local scheduling requirements are more detailed and 
encompassing. The local scheduling branch is responsible for 
the preparation^ coordination and publication of the weekly 
combat crew schedule. Scheduling policy itself is a function 
which lies under the Deputy Commander for Operations. The 
scheduling branch in conjunction with the Deputy Commander for 
Operations, establish scheduling parameters and guidelines for 
missile combat crew members (MCCMs).
Local requirements dictate that alerts be performed by 
integral crews to the maximum extent possible. An integral crew 
refers to a crew commander and deputy who have undergone 
required training together as a crew. As well, the non-integral 
alert rate should not exceed 15 percent of the total number of 
alerts performed within a given month. In addition, it is 
desirable that MCCMs perform alert duties at launch control 
centers within their own squadron and at their own assigned 
sites whenever possible. While obviously not a solid 
requirement that would be detrimental to the mission if not met, 
it does impact on the morale of the crew force and should 
therefore be met if possible. Site integrity promotes a sense 
of pride and belonging among MCCMs. This in turn helps to keep 
each site properly maintained and configured on a continual 
basis and instills a home-like atmosphere on site rather than a 
feeling of alienation among crew members.
The scheduling branch at Malmstrom will normally schedule 
line crews for a combination of alerts and backups (an on-call
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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condition of being prepared to assume alert duties in case of 
another's illness) not to exceed eight in number. Flight 
commander crews will normally be scheduled for a combination of 
four alerts and two backups not to exceed six alert actions. 
Finally, instructor and evaluator crews will normally be 
scheduled for two alerts and no backups. In addition to these 
requirements, no more than one-ninth of the crew force, by 
position, should be on leave at one time. An example of a 
typical monthly combat crew schedule can be seen in Figure 8. 
These many and varied scheduling constraints, both command level 
and local, must be considered when examining any proposed 
alternatives.
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■o E = Education Day (One Day Per Week)
§■ K = 2 4  Hour Alert to Kilo Launch Control CenteraO M2 = Squadron Commander's Call (Quarterly 2 Hour Meeting) ÜJK3MPT = 4 Hour Monthly Missile Procedures Trainer Session
3 T1 = Combat Crew Training Day
Ü T34 = Partial Training Day (Monthly Weapon System and Code Proficiency)
§_ T8 = Partial Training Day (Annual Small Arms Training)
MPT = 4 Hour Monthly Missile Procedures Trainer Session
o X = Combat Crew Member's Request For Non-Duty (Daughter's Birthday)
/ = Partial Alert Day Due To Driving
Fig. 8. TYPICAL MISSILE COMBAT CREW MONTHLY OPERATIONS SCHEDULE
CHAPTER VI 
ALTERNATIVES INTRODUCED AND DISCUSSED
A number of creative alternatives have been proposed to 
deal with the problem of alert load inequities due to excessive 
driving distances. Some of these options have been introduced 
by previous works referenced in chapter two, other alternatives 
are original as a result of this study. This chapter serves to 
introduce the main body of these proposals but will not dwell on 
those options which lack feasibility or which fall considerably 
short of established constraints. Less desirable options will 
be examined in a very broad sense and only far enough to put 
forth the logic for rejection.
One obvious alternative in any proposal is to do nothing to 
change the current situation. Doing nothing indicates that the 
status quo is either acceptable or the best that can be 
achieved. Certainly the present system has existed for a number 
of years. There has always been a certain amount of discontent 
but crew member morale has not significantly affected the 
overall mission effectiveness. The fact that Malmstrom AFB has 
the 37th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) as a tenant 
unit should in and of itself suggest another possible solution
to this transportation problem. After all, the increased use of
33
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helicopters would surely provide the Increased speed and direct 
routing needed to provide crew transportation to the distant 
sites. Another Intriguing alternative to the present system Is 
the mini-base concept. The opening of a mini-base about 120 
miles east of Great Falls <In the Lewlstown area), from which 
crews could dispatch, would alleviate Inequitable driving times 
by reducing driving distances altogether. As well, an 
Interesting concept for consideration Is the four capsule plan. 
The Minuteman deployment at Malmstrom currently calls for five 
launch control centers (LCCs) and fifty missiles per squadron. 
Under the four capsule plan, one capsule In each of the 
squadrons could be shut down to Include LCCs In the Minuteman 
III (CDB) system as well. This plan would entail the closing of 
the farthest site In each squadron: Echo LCC In the lOth SMS,
Foxtrot LCC In the 12th SMS, Oscar LCC In the 490th SMS, and 
Quebec LCC In the 564th SMS.
The Idea of altering the length of alerts deserves 
consideration also. The concept of 36 hour alerts using 
rotating crews Is not a new one, as this system was used 
extensively in the 60's and 70's. The Idea was to have two 
awake crew members at all times pulling twelve hour shifts. For 
example, a crew. Crew B, would depart the base in the morning to 
relieve Crew A who had just pulled their night shift. Crew A, 
upon being relieved would sleep upstairs In the officer's 
quarters while the fresh Crew B pulled a day shift alert. After 
approximately twelve hours In rest status Crew A would relieve
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Crew B and pull another night shift before departing for base. 
Crew B would finish their alert by pulling another day shift 
while the fresh Crew C had already entered rest status topside. 
Thus twenty-four hours of work were split up by a twelve hour 
rest period with some variations. The establishment of 48 hour 
alerts using one combat crew is another outcome of the idea of 
altering the length of alert tours. It could provide the same 
alert coverage as the present system with no proposed increases 
in personnel costs. It could halve the total driving time to 
and from alert as well as the current accident rate, 
consequently impacting upon operating costs with significant 
savings. Crew members would also benefit by eliminating four 
"partial days" which are presently spent returning from alerts
when the majority of the business day is complete.
A weighted point system, when used to assign alert loads, 
would force equality by making overall driving distances equal. 
The concept is to assign point values to each site based on
travel times. The ideal outcome would be for each crew member
to have approximately the same point totals at the end of each 
month, thus forcing an equalization. It has already been 
established that many crew members at "far sites" work the 
equivalent of an extra alert each month due to driving 
distances. Therefore, another logical solution to this problem 
would be to increase the manning at the "far sites." For an 
average month of 30 days, a manning increase of two crew members 
(one crew), will decrease by one the number of monthly alerts
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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for eight other crews < two flights). Assuming four line crews 
per site and eight alerts per month per crew, it would take four 
new crews to effectively equalize the workload at the seven 
designated "far sites."
The final alternative for consideration is, strictly 
speaking, not an alternative at all, but rather a frame of mind 
that should exist and be employed with any option which is 
considered for implementation. The scheduling branch on base 
has a truly demanding task, that of funneling a myriad of 
training and alert requirements into the schedules of over 200 
people. With this type of workload, care must be taken to 
ensure that alerts are not indiscriminately planned and 
scheduled so that the problem of alert load inequities can be 
solved. The scheduling office itself must go one step beyond 
the letter of the regulations in order to find answers and 
alternatives which are not only acceptable but optimal. The Air 
Force is obviously not the place for organized labor initiatives 
but it should be noted that the best ideas for improvements 
usually come from within the system, as quality circles have 
proven. The scheduling office must not only be a part of these 
activities and studies but they must strive to be the 
organizational hub of the system.
STATUS QUO
While maintaining the status quo will not remedy the
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perceived morale problems, it does not violate the constraints 
either and is therefore a viable option. But quality of life 
standards dictate that the present system should be examined for 
possible areas of change in light of the equity issues that 
presently face the crew member. It would appear to be 
advantageous for everyone involved to attempt some type of 
improvement to the current system, even if only on a trial 
basis.
HELICOPTER DISPATCH
A number of obstacles prevent this idea from moving past 
the conceptual stage, namely: operations and maintenance costs,
initial inventory costs, mission priorities and staggered 
changeover8. The operations and maintenance costs for the Bell
Model UHF-IN helicopter are currently running at $420 per hour
2 5as can be seen in Table 3 below.
TABLE 3
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE COSTS PER HOUR 
FOR THE BELL MODEL UHF-IN HELICOPTER
Maintenance on Base................   $130
Dep Maintenance ........................... 135
Spare Parts.............    80
Fuel Consumption...........    75
Total Hourly Cost.........................  $420
This amount does not include the cost of the two-man crew
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used to fly the aircraft as this, for the moment, is considered 
a sunk cost. The helicopter itself can support three missile 
crews or six passengers in all with no significant problems 
compared with the Chevrolet Suburban, presently being used by 
the crew force, which averages operations and maintenance costs 
of only 23 cents per mile.^6 Since the UHF-IN can carry three 
missile crews and the Suburbans are presently used, one to a 
site for each crew, the cost difference is truly staggering.
Per crew, the helicopter costs $140 per hour compared to 23 
cents per mile for the carry-all. As well, the initial cost of 
a Model UHF-IN helicopter is approximately $1.2 million compared 
to $15,423 for the Chevrolet Suburban.
A possible loop hole in this cost dilemma would be to 
utilize current excess helicopter capacity. Helicopter pilots, 
like any other pilots, are required to log a minimum number of 
hours each month in order to maintain their proficiency. 
Certainly any time not spent on higher mission priorities could 
be used to transport crews. This appears plausible until one 
looks at the mission priority of transporting crews in relation 
to other existing priorities. Mission one priorities consist of 
emergency air rescue operations and special operations as 
directed by the wing commander. Mission two priorities are used 
to provide air cover for category I (nuclear) convoys. Mission 
three priorities involve critical parts deliveries, some 
security changeovers, and special requests from the director of 
operations. All other requests for support, such as crew
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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changeover, are considered next. One can therefore see that 
without additional assets, helicopter support for crew transport 
Is quite undependable. If the "far" sites (previously defined 
as KOI, LOI, MOl, NOl, OOl, and EOl) were to fly dedicated 
missions each day, it would call for two additional helicopters 
in the inventory, costing a total of $2.4 million - quite out of 
the question considering our economic constraints. Even if SAC 
could afford this expense, reliability of transport would be in 
question due to the relatively unpredictable nature of the 
weather in Montana.
Finally, crew members who have travelled out to site via 
helicopter have an additional complaint - staggered changeovers. 
With three crews being transported at the same time, a takeoff 
and landing is required at each site. The closest site is 
usually dropped off first and so on. The helicopter normally 
takes thirty minutes to refuel after the third drop and heads 
back in reverse order for pick up. Thus the old crews at the 
first drop off point tend to wait an excessive amount of time 
for the other crews to be picked up. This staggered changeover, 
often combined with mechanical delays and miscellaneous part 
deliveries, has at times delayed crews even past the time that 
they would normally arrive at the support base by driving. The 
bottom line dictates that the benefits received from this option 
are imagined and not worth the extra cost, thus eliminating this 
alternative by means of the economic constraints already set 
forth.
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MINI - BASE
The mini-base concept is interesting but not feasible at 
the present time due to tremendous set-up, operations and 
maintenance costs.^® A mini operating base in the Lewistown 
area would have to consider a number of factors. To operate 
this base for the "far" sites (KOI, LOI, MOl, NOl, 001, and EOl) 
one could assume that about 80 operations personnel; to include 
crew members administration specialist, facility managers and 
staff; would have to be relocated. In addition, it would make 
sense to deploy security police and cooks from this location 
which would tally approximately 100 more individuals. Family 
housing would probably have to be provided for at least half of 
these individuals (those married) leaving the remaining portion 
of the contingent to live off variable housing allowances on the 
local economy. Currently government living quarters are valued 
at approximately $60,GOO each. If 90 housing units were built, 
this cost would rapidly escalate into $5,400,000. This does not 
even begin to consider utilities, and the continuing maintenance 
contracts that would have to be met. These costs alone would be 
prohibitive in light of the stated economic constraints.
Another consideration would be the costs of land and 
construction in the Lewistown area. The problem of logistics 
and supply would have to be solved as all supplies needed to 
keep the launch control facilities and the base itself operative
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would have to be transported on a continual basis from Malmstrom 
or a separate supply function would have to be set up on the 
mini-base. A transportation contingent would have to be 
organized to support travel from the mini-base itself. These 
are only a fraction of the support functions that would have to 
be considered. With additional support facilities, the need for 
more housing increases. Certainly some compensation would have 
to be made to personnel for lack of a BX, commissary and medical 
facilities. If these facilities were not furnished by the 
mini-base, there would surely exist a morale problem similar to 
that of being assigned to a remote location. Surely the 
necessity of continual combat crew training exists and must be 
provided for in the proposal. As stated earlier, the combat 
crew member faces a variety of training in terms of weapons 
system proficiency, codes and missile procedures simulation.
One might have to consider building multi-million dollar 
training facilities at the mini-base to include missile 
procedure trainers or simulators. If this takes place, then 
logically additional personnel would be required to relocate in 
order to train and evaluate crews as well as to operate and 
maintain the simulators. The multiplier effect would continue 
to function on numerous operations downstream until these and 
other logistical problems would transform this mini-base into a 
major installation.
In hindsight, this proposal might have had a chance if it 
could have been coordinated with the arrival of the new air
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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refueling wing. A multi-million dollar base construction effort 
has already been initiated to prepare Malmstrom for the arrival 
of a new tanker wing in the 1988/89 timetable. While this 
includes as variety of costs which are peculiar to an aircraft 
operation, such as runway improvements and alert facility 
construction, costs are devoted to providing additional housing 
and building capacity as well. If an operational missile 
squadron and associated support people were to leave Malmstrom 
and set up operations in Lewistown this would obviously create 
excess capacity in terms of housing and office space on base.
The tanker wing, under this new proposal, would move into the 
vacancies provided by the departing missile contingent. A good 
portion of the funds that would have been used in the tanker 
operation could then be diverted to the mini-base operation, 
thus providing relief to the tremendous start up costs that 
would be incurred. This plan requires an in-depth examination 
through the Cost Management Analysis section on base and 
certainly increased attention at the headquarters level. Even 
then, such a plan would probably be too late as most contractual 
arrangements have already been made. A study for the diversion 
of funds in conjunction with a thorough study of mini-base costs 
would entail an entire thesis in itself. Suffice it to say that 
for now the mini-base concept violates pre-established economic 
constraints. However; should funds be provided for future 
missions at Malmstrom, such as the Midgetman Missile, this 
concept of a mini-base should be examined in conjunction with
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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any initiai planning or budget proposals.
FOUR CAPSULE SQUADRON
The Minuteman deployment at Malmstrom currently calls for 
five launch control centers (LCCs) and fifty missiles per 
squadron. Under the four capsule plan, one capsule in each of 
the squadrons could be shut down to include LCCs in the 
Minuteman III <CDB> system as well. The plan would entail the 
closing of the farthest site in each squadron: Echo LCC in the
10th SMS, Foxtrot LCC in the 12th SMS, Oscar LCC in the 490th 
SMS, and Quebec LCC in the 564th SMS. This method is 
advantageous because it incorporates savings in terms of the 
number of miles driven by missile crews, man-hours employed, 
along with savings in fuel consumption. It should decrease the 
accident rate, while maintenance and utility costs would fall as 
well. Sufficient missile monitoring capabilities would still 
exist despite the four capsule s q u a d r o n . A t  first glance 
these advantages do seem extremely inviting.
The 341st SMW has been involved in an ongoing modification 
program called RIVET MILE which shuts down one LCC every 90 
days. The procedures used for shutdown and startup are 
extremely effective, well documented and could easily be used in 
implementing the four capsule model. The present procedure 
includes the removal of all classified and code components that 
require combat crew control. In addition, the combat crew has
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ail the necessary checklists to transfer custody of their 
missiles to another launch control center.
Under the RIVET MILE modification program, only the combat 
crew is evacuated. All other site personnel remain. The 
facility manager would still be responsible for the upkeep of 
the launch control facility so that maintenance teams would have 
a place to stay and eat should circumstances force them to 
remain overnight. The security police would probably have to 
remain at present manning levels to provide security for the 
flight area. The security police would also provide the 
controlling VHF communications link needed for the combat crew 
to coordinate activities with maintenance teams at the remote 
launch facilities.
Table 4 shows the projected manning savings by essentially 
eliminating a flight of missile combat crew members. An average 
flight would include three personnel rankings including; 2nd 
lieutenants (0-1), 1st lieutenants (0-2), and captains (0-3).
The yearly cost figures shown include not only pay but accrued 
training costs as well. If this model were employed at all
four squadrons, annual personnel savings would be $1,721,376.
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TABLE 4
ANNUAL PERSONNEL SAVINGS UNDER
THE FOUR CAPSULE APPROACH
Rank Officer Number Number of AnnualCosting Assigned F lights Savings
0-1 $34,030 4 4 $544,4800-2 44,559 4 4 712,9440-3 57,994 2 4 463,952
Total Personnel Savings..
In terms of vehicle savings, the plan would offer 
additional Incentives. A total of 1,159,759 miles are logged 
each year by crew members driving Suburbans In the missile 
complex. Since 20 vehicles are used, this breaks down to 57, 988 
miles driven per vehicle per year- Vehicles at Malmstrom are 
replaced at 250,000 miles, therefore, each crew vehicle has a 
life expectancy of 4.3 years (250,000/57,988). Since a new 
vehicle costs $15,423 and It lasts 4. 3 years, then $3,587 must 
be set aside each year for replacement costs per vehicle. Since 
four vehicles could be eliminated, the annual savings amounts to 
$14,348. In addition, one must consider the operation and 
maintenance savings (Including fuel costs) at $0.23 per mile. 
Four vehicles would log a total of approximately 231,952 miles 
(57,988 X 4) during the year. Thus annual operations and 
maintenance costs to include fuel savings would amount to
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$53,349. The total vehicle savings can be seen in Table 5.̂ ^
TABLE 5
ANNUAL VEHICLE COST SAVINGS 
UNDER THE FOUR CAPSULE SQUADRON
Vehicle Replacement Savings.................$14, 348
Operations and Maintenance Savings.........  53,349
Total Vehicle Savings........  $67, 687
Along with closing down the capsule, other costs savings 
take place including the fuel savings from not operating the 
diesel generator. This would amount to an $11,760 annual 
savings per site for a total annual savings of $47,040. A 
number of other factors would trickle down including the savings 
from less LCC maintenance. Since each LCC contains complex 
communications equipment, computers, and support equipment, all 
these items require preventive and unscheduled maintenance. No 
cost figures were available on these maintenance costs per site 
but the savings in terms of dispatches and possible personnel 
cuts would be significant. The quantifiable costs savings 
compiled thus far amount to 1.0 million dollars and are noted in 
Table 6.
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TABLE 6
ANNUAL QUANTIFIABLE COST SAVINGS 
UNDER THE FOUR CAPSULE SQUADRON
Personnel Savings............ $1,721,376
Vehicle Savings................... 67, 687
Diesel Fuel Savings.............. 47, 040
Total Savings.............SI, 836, 103
Substantial economic benefits arise when the four capsule 
system is in effect. But does it really solve the crew members 
problem of inequitable alert loads? Upon eliminating the 
farthest capsule in each squadron, the 490th SMS would still 
have four sites with mean return times after 1300 p. m. . It is 
certainly a step in the right direction in terms of cost, but 
this decreased workload would not necessarily mean fewer alerts. 
Chances are very good that if this system was deployed, it would 
logically be accompanied by a 20 percent decrease in crew 
manning to accompany the 20 percent decrease in launch control 
centers. Thus workloads would stay the same and the amount of 
work per alert would actually increase due to increased flight 
responsibilities at the remaining capsules. As shown earlier, 
the Increased workload may certainly be worth the large cost 
savings incurred, but this plan would have to be coupled with 
other measures to solve the inequitable work load dilemma.
The biggest obstacle this option faces is political in 
nature. The idea of eliminating one capsule really goes against
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the Idea of Minuteman itself which is based on dispersed sites, 
weapon system redundancy, and hardened facilities. Each LCC 
eliminated would essentially free Soviet missiles from these 
targets, making them available for deployment elsewhere. This 
is no small matter considering the present strategic balance.
One could surmise that deactivated LCCs could be repostured when 
needed at higher states of readiness and this fact alone should 
help squelch current doubts. One could probably also conjecture 
that if one LCC can be safely shut down, perhaps two or three is 
even better. Weapon system safety rules as contained in AFR 
122-23 become very critical when only three capsules or less are 
operational. It is not entirely unusual for two capsules to be 
down due to maintenance or modification purposes. If this were 
to happen with a three capsule squadron, the possibility exists 
that only one crew would be in charge of fifty nuclear missiles, 
definitely not an acceptable situation under current weapon 
system safety guidelines.
In summary, the four capsule approach more than meets our 
economic constraints and actually is economically beneficial 
outside the realm of the alert load problem itself. The 
political constraints it faces are great but not insurmountable, 
especially if further LCC reductions were ruled out and LCC 
reposturing plans were employed at higher states of readiness. 
Finally, this plan would have to be implemented in conjunction 
with another viable option if it is to solve alert load 
inequities.
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This approach did reduce the number of alerts required of 
crew members during the month but more time was indeed spent on 
site to make up for this fact. According to our scheduling
office, this option would require a 33 percent increase in the
32size of the crew force. If one extrapolated cost figures
from the four capsule model, a 33 percent increase in personnel 
cost would amount to an annual budget increase of $2,582,064.
SAC was able to abandon this system by allowing one crew member 
at a time to enter rest status in the capsule so that 24 hour 
shifts could be implemented without having to leave the capsule. 
SAC has also relieved any fears of crew members possibly 
tampering with weapon system components by sealing those devices 
it deemed as critical, thus allowing one person to sleep.
There seems to be no apparent reason to go back to a more 
expensive approach that does not attempt to address alert load 
inequities. Therefore economic constraints as well as current 
scheduling constraints render this plan undesirable.
4a_H0UR_ALERTS/QNE_CREW
A cost analysis of the 48 hour alert provides some very 
real, definite benefits. A comparison of the current 24 hour 
schedule with the 48 hour concept is depicted in Figure 9. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7)
CD"OOQ.
CgQ.
■D
CD
(/)
C/)
8
CD
CD"OOQ.C
9-o
o
■D
CD
C/)
C/)
Sample Schedule Using the 24 Hour Alert Concept:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 la 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
K / K / E  K / T I E  K /  T34 K / E MPT K / K / E  K / E
n Sample Schedule Using the 48 Hour Alert Concept:
■n
I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
K K / E  K K / E T34 E K K / E MPT T1 E K K /
K = 2 4  Hour Alert to Kilo Launch Control Center 
3 KK = 48 Hour Alert to Kilo Launch Control Center
/ = Wasted "Partial" Day Due To Driving
T1 = Full Training Day
T34 = Partial Training Day
MPT = 4 Hour Missile Procedures Trainer Session
E = Education Day
Source: Carwile, Sikorra, "A Cost/Benefit Analysis of 48 Hour Alerts", p. A-2.
Fig. 9 24/48 HOUR ALERT SCHEDULE COMPARISON
LnO
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48 hour alert schedule saves an average of 14 hours of driving 
time for the average crew member each month. This figure is 
based upon the fact that the average crew member drives, in 
round trip figures, 3 hours and 26 minutes each alert tour.
More importantly, the proposed schedule frees up four partial 
days which would otherwise have been wasted by driving well into 
the late afternoon at the more distant sites. It is evident 
from looking at Figure 9 that free time comes in clumps under 
the 48 hour model rather than sporadically, as happens now under 
the current system. In addition, education days often appear 
crowded with other activities and training under the current
system whereas they appear relatively free and dedicated under
33the 48 hour design.
In terms of cost, the 48 hour alert provides some 
additional eye-opening advantages. In terms of operations and 
maintenance cost to include fuel, this option would save 
approximately $133,372 annually. This figure is based on 
1,159,759 total annual miles driven by 20 vehicles. If 48 hour 
alerts were implemented it would cut these miles to 579,879. At 
$0.23 per mile, this cost is now $133,372 (.23 x 579,879). The 
annual vehicle replacement costs will also decrease under the 48 
hour assumption. As mentioned above, crew vehicles are normally 
replaced at 250, OOO miles. Therefore, under the new concept, 
each vehicle could have a life expectancy of 8.6 years and 
therefore a savings of $35,860 would be incurred due to 
decreased annual replacement costs. The annual operations.
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maintenance and replacement cost savings are examined more 
closely in Table 7.
The cost savings are apparent and have been readily 
demonstrated but the psychological constraints facing a 48-hour 
alert could cause problems. There are definite drawbacks to this 
approach stemming from the psychological concerns of placing 
crew members in this type of isolated environment for a period 
of 48 hours. This situation in turn could affect the safety of 
the entire weapon system. The Personnel Reliability Program, 
which was explained earlier, warns against personality and 
behavior factors that may seriously affect reliability.^^
Fatigue and "being closed in" are common complaints lodged 
against performing double alert duties. These feelings have 
been, on occasion, validated, as some crews have actually 
experienced 48 hour alerts due to weather conditions which 
prevented crew travel. This fatigue could lead to strained 
behavior exhibited by excessive arguing, impulsiveness, 
agitation or unusual sadness. This conjecture would best be 
analyzed by means of field observations, as further analysis at 
this time would be mere speculation.
Other drawbacks to this solution include a lack of hygiene 
since there is no shower available in the capsule. Also, the 
extended separation from family is a common complaint. Even 
though more time at home seems to be generated in the long run, 
two consecutive evenings away can be viewed as less desirable 
than "just one night." No research was conducted to find out if
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TABLE 7
ANNUAL VEHICLE COST SAVINGS 
UNDER THE 46 HOUR ALERT PLAN
24 Hour Plan 48 Hour Plan Savings
Operations, 
Maintenance 
and Fuel 
Costs
1,159,759 Total Mileage 
X .23 Cost per Mile
579,879 
. 23
Total Mileage 
Cost per Mile
$266,744 $133,372 $133,372
Vehicle
Replacement
Costs
1,159,759 Total Miles 579,879 Total Miles
20 Vehicles 20 Vehicles
= 57,987.55 Miles Driven 
Per Vehicle Per Year
= 28,993.98 Miles Driven 
Per Vehicle Per Year
Uiw
Vehicles are replaced at 
250,000 miles. Therefore, 
each vehicle has a life 
expectancy of 4. 3 years,
(250,000/57,987.55).
Since a new vehicle costs 
$15,423 and lasts 4.3 years, 
then $3586 must be set aside 
for each vehicle every year. 
Thus, the annual vehicle 
replacement cost is 
20 X $3586 or
$71,720
Total Vehicle Savings
Vehicles are replaced at 
250,000 miles. Therefore, 
each vehicle has a life 
expectancy of 8.6 years,
<250,000/28, 993.98).
Since a new vehicle costs 
$15,423 and lasts 8.6 years, 
then $1793 must be set aside 
for each vehicle every year. 
Thus, the annual vehicle 
replacement cost is 
20 X $1793 or
$35,860 $35,860 
$169,232
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crew members' wives share this same opinion. So although this 
option is economically pleasing, psychological constraints could 
invalidate the approach. This could only be proven via field 
studies and general combat crew attitudes which will be examined 
in the survey itself. In addition to these factors, the 48 hour 
approach, while decreasing the driving times at all the sites, 
would not serve to equalize overall workloads. The approach as 
a whole, however, does deserve further consideration.
WEIGHTED_PQINT EQUALIZATION
A very simple weighted point scale can be seen in Table 8. 
This scale was devised using one way driving distances as the 
main variable for determining intervals. Oscar LCC is the 
furthest site in the complex at a one way distance of 139 miles. 
Since the system under consideration includes 15 sites, 15 
intervals have been used. The length of these intervals should 
be 9.26 units <139/15), but for rounding purposes nine units is 
used with last interval being an open interval to adjust for the 
rounding mechanism.
The overall average one way driving distance in the complex 
is 79. 4 miles. Looking at the various intervals, this value 
would be worth nine points on the weighted scale. Since the 
average line crew member performs eight alert actions in a 
month, the scheduling branch would be required to mix and match 
alerts to give crew members a point value of approximately 72
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TABLE
WEIGHTED
8
POINT SCALE
Miles
Point
Value
Site Position 
By Weight
0. OO - 8. 99 1 N/A
9. OO - 17.99 2 N/A
18. OO - 26.99 3 N/A
27. 00 - 35.99 4 AOl
36. 00 - 44.99 5 JOl
45. 00 - 53.99 6 BOl, 101, HOI, GOl
54. 00 - 62..99 7 FOl
63. 00 - 71.99 8 COl
72. 00 - 80.99 9 N/A
81. 00 - 89.99 10 N/A
90. 00 - 98.99 11 MOl, DOl
99. 00 -107.99 12 LOI
108.00 -116.99 13 N/A
117.00 -125.99 14 NOl, KOI
126.00 -138.80 15 EOl, 001
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units <9 points X 8 alerts) per month. Flight commanders would 
equalize at 26 (9 X 4) and instructors and evaluators would 
break even at 18 (9 X 2).
One of the major advantages of this system is that there is 
no cost increases to contend with so that the solution 
definitely lies within pre-established economic constraints.
The problem lies in the area of scheduling limitations. The 
degree of input needed for a workable alert schedule would 
increase dramatically as it becomes much more important where 
alerts are performed. A related disadvantage of this solution 
is the loss of site integrity. With the requirement to perform 
site-specific alerts, the sense of a "home site” is lost. 
Subsequently site continuity in terms of maintenance, daily 
house keeping and flight esprit de corp, would be lost. In 
addition, control is lost as crews not assigned that particular 
chain of command are working for different flight and squadron 
commanders. At first a very appealing idea, the weighted point 
equalization option violates some very important scheduling 
constraints which will probably not be relaxed in the near 
future at this wing.
I N Ç R E A S E D _ M A N N I H G / D E Ç R E A S E D _ A L E R T _ L g A D S _ A T _ I F A R _ S I T E S :
The major benefit of this solution is the equality afforded 
through alert compensation for those crews assigned to distant 
s i t e s . I n  addition, the total number of work hours can be
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approximately equalized with no immediate increases in the 
budget. The current manning level for the crew force stands at 
106 percent, therefore, no budget increases are necessary as 
long as sound apportionment of personnel resources is employed 
among the three squadrons. This approach would involve the 
transfer of current crew members from one squadron to another. 
The implementation strategy would involve gathering crew members 
and introducing them only to the sites needing further manning. 
Since the wing is currently being over-manned by 6 percent, 
about 8-9 crew members could be consolidated into the squadrons 
having the "far sites." The 10th SMS and the 490th SMS would 
receive the new crews. Based on the number of far sites in each 
squadron one crew <two crew members) would go to the 10th SMS 
and three crews (six crewmembers) would go to the 490th. The 
new crews could immediately assume alert duties from currently 
assigned crews. Normal assignment procedures could continue 
upon the arrival of new crew members with the next class from 
Vandenberg but manning levels should continue to be monitored to 
ensure that the far sites obtain the necessary manning to reduce 
their alert load by one alert each month.
Should the manning level at this wing fall below 106 
percent, to 100 percent for example, this would invalidate the 
approach and additional funds would have to be spent to raise 
the manning level to its previous marks. These additional costs 
would be similar to those already explained in the four capsule 
approach as seen in Table 4 earlier. This possible economic
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constraint does not have to exist if the manning personnel at 
Headquarters SAC and at the Air Force Manpower Personnel Center 
effectively monitor and ensure a steady flow of entrants into 
Malmstrom.
A possible psychological or morale problem may arise if 
only some sites were reduced to seven alerts per month, as 
resentment and jealousy may flourish. This solution therefore, 
would be easy to implement and would also remain within economic 
constraints but could meet with some resentment at the grass 
roots level. The biggest resistance would take place when crew 
members are pulled from their current positions and placed in 
the new ones. Even though they fill overage manning slots at 
present, they are performing duties in those slots that will 
have to be filled by someone else in their squadron. Although 
there will always be some resistance to change, this option 
should meet less resistance than some of the others simply 
because it is only a modification to the existing system and not 
an implementation of a new system altogether. Equity, 
nonetheless, would be served.
d i s ç r i m i n a î e _s ç h e d u l i n g
An example of how discriminate scheduling can make a 
difference is the idea of the missile combat crew workweek 
average. SAC developed a computer program for figuring out the 
average line crew member's basic workweek over a three-month
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period. They stated that the desired workweek average should be 
less than 54 hours. An acceptable workweek average lies between 
54 and 58 hours. Workweek averages above 58 hours should be 
examined to ensure an equitable distribution of the wing's work 
requirements. The basic workweek includes those requirements 
that pertain to all crew members such as: alert duty, briefings, 
travel, all training and evaluations. Education days and
o £standby duty are not included in this average. When asked
whether any crew members had recently appeared in the danger 
zone, scheduling responded that a crew member has not been in 
the 58 hour zone in months. How could this be? If an average 
Oscar crew is assigned eight alerts a month or two a week, than 
they will go over this limit quite easily. From the beginning 
of the pre-departure briefing at 0800 a.m. until approximately 
15:05 p.m. the next day, that crew is working or returning from 
work. This period covers a 31 hour stretch. Twice this value 
amounts to 62 hours alone, certainly above the 58 hour limit. 
This figure does not even contain any other extra weekly 
training requirements or time spent on additional Air Force 
related duties. Additional problems with the average include 48 
hour alerts that are only counted as 24 hour tours by the 
scheduling computer. This took place during a recent exercise 
when one squadron pulled double alerts with no compensation due 
to the mentality that "an alert is an alert" no matter how long 
in duration.
While not directly related to the problem of alert
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inequities, poorly planned leave is yet another issue worthy of 
mention because it does affect crew member morale and can be 
dealt with through discriminative scheduling. If an individual 
takes half a month off he can almost always expect to pull 60 to 
75 percent of his normal monthly workload, thus being penalized 
for taking leave in the first place. The present scheduling 
office believes that leave is built into the three month
workweek average thus bringing down these averages to an
3 7acceptable level. If this is the case, the workweek average
needs to be changed from within. Other requirements, such as 
additional duties, should be incorporated into the workweek 
average to reflect true work loads. The computer program used 
to determine these averages could be run before a schedule is 
published and after the month is complete to ensure that 
compensation and equity is achieved to the maximum extent 
possible. While this may sound like an extreme amount of work, 
it need not be. At the present time, flight commanders are 
creating and submitting their flight's monthly schedules in 
accordance with constraints given to them by the scheduling 
branch. The flight commander would be a logical person to keep 
track of workload averages within his flight. A computer 
program would not be needed on such a small scale. In this way, 
a flight commander could submit high averages to scheduling for 
compensation during the next month.
Another sample area for internal improvement would be the 
alert scheduling done for the instructor and evaluator shops.
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Since these individuals have only two alert actions per month, 
it should be possible to use their alerts to count for reducing 
alert load inequities. At present, the instructor and evaluator 
shops employing about 42 crew members, are scheduled for one 
short and one long site a month. Since these individuals will 
not violate a site's integrity, because they have no assigned 
site, they could be used to perform most of their alerts in the 
490th SMS and at the far sites in the 10th SMS. This would be 
more difficult for evaluator crews who must, from time to time, 
inspect every capsule in the wing. But the fact is that this 
would be an effective form of compensation for those pulling 
alert duties at remote locations. Further studies could also be 
conducted into giving instructor and evaluator crews three 
alerts instead of two. Recently the flight commander crews 
picked up responsibilities for all the wing's backup or standby 
requirements, giving them in effect the possibility of six alert 
actions per month. Since this backup or standby responsibility 
was normally the job of instructors and evaluators, these shops 
should be able to handle a three alert monthly alert load.
A number of scheduling alternatives exist today that would 
not present major changes in the way current business is 
conducted. One such change would be the implementation of an 
earlier pre-departure briefing, possibly at 06:00 or 07:00 a.m. 
This would allow the further sites to get home at a reasonable 
hour without missing most of the business day. These 
possibilities, and others yet unexplored all lie within the
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scheduling system as it stands now. What is presently needed is 
a very discriminating and aggressive scheduling approach that 
looks for continual feedback and which seeks out and analyzes 
new alternatives in search of the optimal.
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CHAPTER VII 
SURVEY ANALYSIS 
IHE_MISSILE_ÇOMBAT_ÇREW_MEMBER_SÇHEDyLING_SyRVEY
A missile combat crew member (MCCM) scheduling survey was 
conducted as a part of this study in order to examine crew 
member attitudes toward the current scheduling system and toward 
alternative systems previously discussed in this study. The 
survey, in its entirety, is presented as Figure lO. It consists 
of four major sections containing questions on the respondents 
personal data, the current alert schedule, system alternatives 
and other attitudes affecting scheduling. A nominal scale was 
used in the first section of the survey to place respondents in 
categories based on questions concerning personal data. An 
ordinal scale was used for the rest of the survey in order to 
determine a rank ordering of response for questions dealing with 
a matter of preference. The survey itself was tested using a
group of nine missile combat crew members, three from each
squadron. Refinements were made to the instrument based on the 
comments of these individuals. The survey targets the
population itself instead of attempting to use cluster sampling
techniques. For the purposes of this study, the population
63
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MCCM SCHEDULING S U R V E Y
This survey is a f o l l o w - u p  on a previous D O -approved study which c o n s idered topics of crew member morale and alternative schedu l i n g  systems. The results of this study will be used to analyze our c u r r e n t  system a n d  to examine crew member attitudes 
co n c e r n i n g  a number of additional alternative systems not previo u s l y  examined. Please complete this survey and return 
to your Ass i s t a n t  O p e r a t i o n s  Officer by 6 August.C o l l e c t i o n  points are : Major Buckingham - lUth SMb, __
Capt Eversole - 12th 3 MS, and Capt Armour - 490th SMb.
Thank you for your participation.
Fig. 10. M i s s i l e  C o m b a t  C r e w  M e m b e r  S u r v e y
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MCCM SCHEDULING SURVEY
I. PERSONAL DATA:
1. Rank :
1. 2Lt2. iLt3. Capt
2. Position:
1. Deputy2. Commander3. Flight Deputy4. Flight Commander
3. Squadron :
1. 10th SMS2. 12th SMS3. 490th SMS
lurrent Flight:
i. AOl 2. BOl 3. COl 4. DOl 5. EOl
6. FOl 7. □ 01 S. HOI 9. 101 10. JOl
11. KOI 12. LOI 13. MOl 14. NOl 15- 001
Time on Line:
1. 0 - 6 months2. 7 - 12 months3. 13 - 24 months4. 25 - 36 months5. 37 - 48 months
6. Marital Status:
1. Married With No Children2. Married With Children3. Single4. Single Parent
For all questions, unless otherwise noted, rate your answer on a "1" to "5" scale as follows :
stronglydisagree slightlydisagree indifferent slightlyagree stronglyagree
II.
7.
a.
9.
CURRENT ALERT SCHEDULE:
I^am content with current alert schedule in regards toLCCs where I pull alerts. 
1 2  3 4 5
including travelI feel that the time spent pulling alerts, c time, is equal among the three ILLS squadrons.
1 2 3 4 5
I feel that I spend more time pulling alerts, including travel time, than the rest of the ILCS squadrons.
1 . Y es No
F i g .  10. ( c o n t . )  M i s s i l e  C o m b a t  C r e w  M e m b e r  S u r v e y
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I± you answered ”Nü" to Question 9, skip to question 15 It not, cont LAue- '
10. I teei that this "extra” time pulling alerts affects mv job performance. ^
1 2 3 4 5strongly slightly indifferent slightly stronalv disagree disagree agree agree
1 1 .
13.
14.
I feel that this "extra" time pulling alerts affects my family/home life. ^
12. I feel that this "extra" time pulling alerts affects social life. my
I feel that this "extra" time pulling alerts affects my attitude toward the Air Force.
1 2 3 4 5
I feel that this "extra" time pulling alerts affects my health and menta 1/general well-being.
1 2 3 4 5
III. SYSTEM ALTERNATIVES:
The following questions are designed to analyze crew member attitudes toward a variety of alternative alert scheduling systems.
15. I feel that the current scheduling system should bemaintained with no changes.
1 2 3 4 5
16. I feel that the current scheduling system should bemaintained but that helicopters should be used for crew transport on a daily basis if possible.
1 2 3 4 5
17. I feel that a mini-base should be set up at a locationcloser to the far sites (perhaps the Lewistown a r e a ) where my family and I could live and work.
1 2 3 4 5
18. I feel that one capsule (the most distant) in each squadronshould be deactivated to reduce the number of miles whichcrew members must drive.
1 2 3 4 5
19. I feel that we should go back to the older system ofpulling 36 hour alerts using two crews with 12 hour rotations.
we should pull four 48-hour alerts per month )ne crew, provided a sufficient amount of time )efore any other training requirements are met.
20. I feel thatusing only oiis allowed bef qi
1 2 3 4 5
Fig. 10. (cont.) Missile Combat Crew Member Survey
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21. I feel that we should use a "weighted point equalization" system where each site is given a paint value based on its d ist a nee from the base. L. lose sites would be assigned low values and far sites would be assigned high values ' MCCIIs would then be measured monthly by the point system The goal would be to have equal points among all MCCMs' (therefore, equal driving time) at the end of the month This approach would have to violate site and squadron integrity.
1 2 3 4 5strongly slightly indifferent slightly stronglydisagree disagree agree agree
22. I feel that crew member manning should be increased at the squadrons with more distant sites so that these crews would be compensated by pulling only seven alerts per month at far sites instead of eight.
1 2 3 4 5
23. I feel that an earlier pre-departure briefing (0600 or 0700) would be better than the current system.
1 2 3 4 5
24. I feel that, of the systems mentioned above, I would prefer :
1. no change to the current system.2. the increased use of helicopter dispatches.3. the mini-base concept,4. the four capsule squadron approach.5. 36 hour alerts using two crews with 1.2 hour rotations.6. 48 hour alerts using one crew.7. the weighted point system.a. increased manning/decreased alert loads at the far sites,9. an earlier pre-departure.10. one not mentioned (please e x p lain).________________________
IV. OTHER ATTITUDES AFFECTING SCHEDULING:
25. I feel that alerts, in general, have more of an effecton my general health and well-being rather than the driving distances.
1 2 3 4 5
26. I feel that pulling eight alerts a month is too much regardless of the driving time involved.
1 2 3 4 5
27. I feel that a crew member's workweek average should bs- computed every month and that those individuals with higher than normal work averages should be compensated in the following month.
1 2 3 4 5
28. I feel that instructor and evaluator crews should pull mostof their alerts at distant sites to help to relieve driving distance for crew members assigned to these sites.
F i g .  10. ( c o n t . )  M i s s i l e  C o m b a t  C r e w  M e m b e r  S u r v e y
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, 6 8
I feel that instructor and evaluator crews should pull three alerts per month to reduce the alert load for lin<crew members.
1 2 3 4 5strongly slightly indifferent slightly strong]ydisagree disagree agree agree
30. I feel that I have been penalized in the past for taking leave due to an inappropriate amount of alerts being scheduled upon my return.
F i g .  10. ( c o n t . )  M i s s i l e  C o m b a t  C r e w  M e m b e r  S u r v e y
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consisted of MCCMs from three ILCS squadrons, namely: the lOth,
12th and 490th Strategic Missile Squadrons (SMSs).
The survey was hand delivered to the distribution boxes of 
each of the MCCMs in the three ILCS squadrons. One hundred and 
fifty questionnaires were distributed in all, with fifty going 
to each squadron. Ten percent of the population were absent due 
to summer leave during the survey collection period which lasted 
two weeks. This left a possible 135 respondents out of which 99 
replies were received. The response rate was therefore 73 
percent if one considered 135 individuals as the population.
The assistant operations officers in each squadron were used as 
a collection point for all completed surveys.
The 99 questionnaires which were turned in seemed to mirror 
the population itself in a number of ways. The results of the 
questions in the personal data section of the survey were 
examined and compared to the characteristics of the population 
as a whole. The first area examined was rank structure as 
determined by the first question of the survey. The population 
consisted of 18 percent captains, 34 percent first lieutenants 
and 48 percent second lieutenants. Out of the 99 respondents 
surveyed, there were 19.2 percent ranked captains, 37.4 percent 
ranked first lieutenant, and 43.4 percent ranked as second 
lieutenants. These results represent a fairly close comparison 
to the population as can be seen graphically in Table 9. Combat 
crew position structure was a close fit as well. Ten percent of 
the population hold the positions of flight commander (Fit CC)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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• * Histograms * *
File; alert/ Alert Load Inequities
Variable X 1/ Variable Label Is; Rank
CLASS : Low <= High
-INFINITY 
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3
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4. 5
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4. 5 
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#(N= 43 43.4%)####### 2LTs
################### (N= 37 37.4%) ILTs 
########## (N= 19 19.2%) CA P T s
N= 99, Press ENTER to CONTINUE
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and deputy flight commander (Dep Fit CC) respectively. The 
remainder of the population shows 20 percent as commanders 
(MCCCs) and 20 percent as deputies (DMCCCs). Eleven percent of 
the actual survey respondents were flight commanders and 9 
percent were flight commander deputies. Commanders and deputies 
composed 41.4 percent and 38.4 percent of the respondents 
respectively. These results are shown in Table lO.
The third question of the survey organizes respondents into 
squadrons. Since three squadrons are being examined, with 50 
individuals in each, the population is split in thirds. The 
respondents, as seen in Table 11 are almost a perfect match to 
the population in terms of squadron structure. The fourth area 
examined for comparability was flight structure. The 
statistical package used to analyze these data limited the 
capability to compare this variable on a wing wide basis, 
therefore, each squadron had to be examined separately. To 
represent the population, 20 percent of each squadron should be 
present in each flight, as there are five flights to a squadron. 
The 10th SMS approximates this with considerably more response 
from Echo flight, as seen in Table 12. Perhaps this may be due 
to the fact that Echo is one of the two most distant sites in 
the wing. The responses from the 12th SMS are within 5 percent 
of this goal with the exception of Juliett flight as seen in 
Table 13- This deviation was most likely due to a high number 
of summer leaves scheduled for this flight. Finally the 490th 
SMS was also fairly close to the norm according to Table 14.
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File: alert/ Alert Load Inequities 
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Lima flight, like Juliett, also experienced a higher number of 
leaves during this period. The higher than normal response rate 
from Kilo could have been due to the fact that the author of 
this study was Kilo Flight Commander during this period. The 
next variable used to analyze the similarity of the respondents 
to the population was the time on line variable. Five 
categories were used to divide the line crew member into time 
frames. The first two periods covered six month intervals. The 
population exhibits a 20 percent division in each of these 
periods comprising the first year on missile crew duty. The 
next three periods are for one year each up to the usual maximum 
time on line of four years. Twenty percent of the population 
fall into each of these periods. The reason that there is a 
bigger percentage of crew members in the first year on line <40 
percent) can be explained as crew members usually remain on line 
for at least one year before they are selected to evaluator and 
instructor positions. The 99 respondents surveyed fall very 
neatly into these percentages as seen in Table 15.
The last variable compared was marital status. A cursory 
examination of squadron management statistics reveals that 35 
percent of the population are married with no children, 30 
percent are married with children, 30 percent are single, and 
leaving roughly 5 percent as single parents. The respondents 
fall into these categories within a five percent tolerance as 
seen in Table 16. As a whole, these results indicate that the 
survey has indeed reached a representative cross section of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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missile combat crew members in the three ILCS squadrons. This 
is not surprising, since a 73 percent response rate was 
received.
DESÇRIPTIVE_STATISTIÇS
The survey was statistically analyzed by using the 
Micorcomputer-Based Data Analysis Program for the IBM Personal 
Computer. This particular program was selected for use in this 
study because it provided an integrated set of computational 
support aids that were specifically designed for use with survey 
analysis. This segment of the study used descriptive statistics 
to analyze the results of the survey itself. Descriptive 
statistics consist of a variety of methods which provide the
means for concisely presenting the basic information represented
3 8by large collections of raw data. These techniques were used
to get a "feel" for the data and to obtain a general 
understanding of the overall distribution of the response level. 
Since most of the statements beyond the personal data section or 
the survey are ordinal in nature, the program was able to show 
the average level of response with relative ease.
Before the averages could be computed, it was necessary to 
create data base subset definitions. This enabled part of the 
data base to be examined without physically extracting cases 
from the file. A case, for definitions sake, is the completed 
survey of one respondent. This study, as already pointed out.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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involves 99 respondents and therefore 99 cases. Certainly data 
base subsets are extremely useful with this many cases. Table 
17 depicts four subsets (A through D) which were employed in 
this analysis.
TABLE 17 
DATA BASE SUBSET DEFINITIONS
File: alert/Alert Load Inequities
Current Subset Definitions:
A ; X 4 = 1 or 2 or 3
B : X 4 = 4 or 5
C: X 3 ■= 2
D: X 3 = 3
The subsets were set up to divide respondents into categories 
based on whether one's site was defined as "close" or "far" 
site. This seems to require only two subsets but another factor 
deserves consideration. The 12th SMS contains all "close" 
sites, while the 490th SMS contains all "far sites". The 10th 
SMS however is a hybrid containing three "close" sites 
<AOl, BOl, C Q l ) and two "far" sites (DOl and EOl). Responses to 
various scheduling alternatives may show somewhat different 
attitudes in the 10th SMS because a crew member in the 10th SMS
has an opportunity to move closer in to the support base as his
time on line increases. He may start at Echo, one of the 
longest sites in the wing, and may eventually wind up at Alfa, 
one of the closest. Thus this factor was weighed and is taken
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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into account via subset definitions. Subset A includes just the 
data from crew members assigned to AOl, BOl, or COl, the "close" 
sites in the lOth SMS. This is depicted in Table 17 as Subset A 
shows that the answer to statement #4 (current flight) can be a 
1, 2 or 3 (AOl, BOl, or COl). Subset B was set up using a
response of 4 or 5 (DOl, or EOl) for statement #4. This 
particular subset will define the far sites in the 10th SMS. 
Subset C was set using the answer to statement #3 which 
determined the respondent's squadron. Since all sites in the 
12th SMS are close, a response of 2 for statement #3 indicates 
that just the data from the 12th SMS would be analyzed when 
Subset C was selected. Likewise Subset D represents the 490th 
SMS, containing all far sites.
For the purposes of analyzing the responses to preference 
related statements, the 12th SMS (Subset C), and the 490th SMS 
(Subset D) are compared and contrasted first since these 
squadrons represent pure close and far sites respectively. The 
close and far sites in the 10th SMS are then examined, but 
results are explained in detail only if they significantly 
differ from the comparison made between the close and far sites 
of the 12th and 490th SMSs. Thus differences are explained by 
exception only. After the analysis of all statements was 
completed using subset definitions, a preferred alternative was 
determined by analyzing both subset data and the data of all 
respondents as a whole.
Ordinal statements were set up using a scale of one through
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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five. One represents the negative end of the spectrum by 
stating that the respondent strongly disagrees with the 
statement. A score of five indicates a strong sense of 
agreement with the statement, while a three indicates 
indifference. The ordinal questions begin in Section II of the 
survey which analyzes the current alert schedule. These 
statements have been examined first by using Subset C (the 12th 
SMS) and Subset D (the 490th SMS).
Çurrent_Alert_Sçhedule_ResEQnses
Statement #7 through #14 on the survey concern the current 
alert schedule employed at Malmstrom The descriptive statistics 
comparing responses between the 12th SMS and the 490th SMS are 
seen in Table 18. Table 19 contains the statistics comparing 
responses between the lOth SMS close and far sites, namely :
AOl, BOl, and COl compared to DOl and EOl respectively.
In response to statement #7, the close sites (12th SMS) 
almost all "strongly agreed" that they were content in regards 
to the alert schedule at the LCCs where they were assigned alert 
duties. This can be seen by their mean response score of 4. 5 
and median score of 5. The far sites (490th SMS) slightly 
disagreed with that statement and showed definite discontent 
with their current schedules by registering a score of 2. 3 and a 
median of 2. The separation of the means by over 2 points 
indicates a strong difference in contentedness between these two
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TABLE 18
S E C T I O N  II R E  S PO'.. ES ( 1 2 T H  S M S / 4 9 0 T H  S M S )
** Descriptive Statistics **
File: alert/ Alert Load Inequities Subset: C
1 2 t h  S M S
X 7/Content X 8/EqualTim X 9/MoreTime XlO/JobPerfo Xll/Family
X12/Social X13/AttUSAF X14/Health
Var. Mean Std. Dev. Smallest Largest Median
X 7 4.515152 .7550338 1 5 5
X 8 2.575758 1.601373 1 8 2
X 9 1.909091 .2919371 1 4 2
XIO . 2727273 .9770084 0 5 0
Xll . 3030303 1.103541 0 5 0
X12 .3030303 1.103541 0 5 0
X13 2727273 .9770084 0 5 0
X14 .3030303 1.103541 
N= 33, Press
** Deecriptiv
0 5 0 
ENTER to CONTINUE
e Statistics **
File: alert/ Alert Load Inequities Subset: D4 9 0 t h  S M S
X 7/Content X 8/EqualTim X 9/MoreTime 
X12/Social X13/AttUSAF X14/Health
XIO/JobPerfo Xll/Family
Var. Mean Std. Dev. Smallest Largest Median
X 7 2.3125 1.354503 1 5 2
X 8 1.03125 .1767767 1 8 1
X 9 1 0 1 4 1
XIO 3.65625 1. 234174 0 5 4
Xll 4.3125 1.203155 0 5 5
X12 4.21875 1.156591 0 5 5
X13 3.78125 1.288519 0 5 4
X14 3.96875 1.149597 0 5 4
N= 32, Press ENTER to CONTINUE
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TABLE 19
S E C T I O N  II R E S P O N S E S  ( A , B , C / D , E )
*♦ Descriptive Statistics **
File: alert/ Alert Load Inequities Subset: A
A , B , C
X 7/Content X 8/EqualTim X 9/MoreTime XIO/JobPerfo Xll/Family
X12/Social X13/AttUSAF X14/Health
Var. Mean Std. Dev. Smallest Largest Median
X 7 3.941177 1.088036 1 5 4
X 8 1.588235 .8702602 1 8 1
X 9 1.882353 .6966306 1 4 2
XIO .8823529 1.536325 0 5 0
Xll .9411765 1.819017 0 5 0
X12 1.058824 1.983387 0 5 o
X13 .7647059 1.562427 0 5 0
X14 .8823529 1.7278 0 5
N= 17, Press ENTER to CONTINUE 
** Descriptive Statistics **
0
File : alert/ Alert Load Inequities Subset : BD,E
X 7/Content X 8/EqualTim X 9/MoreTime 
X12/Social X13/AttUSAF X14/Health
XIO/JobPerfo Xll/Family
Var. Mean Std. Dev. Smallest Largest Median
X 7 3.117647 1.49509 1 5 3
X 8 1.470588 .8744746 1 8 1
X 9 1.294118 .4696682 1 4 1
XIO 2. 117647 1.932691 0 5 2
Xll 2.941177 2.04544 0 5 4
X12 2.588236 1.970369 0 5 3
X13 2.352941 1.835115 0 5 3
X14 2.235294 1.855041 0 5 2
N= 17, Press ENTER to CONTINUE
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distinct groups. The close and far sites of the 10th SMS were 
not nearly so separated in opinion as the means were different 
by less than one. The attitude in the 10th SMS leaned more 
toward indifference probably because of the "upward and inward" 
opportunities that are present in the hybrid squadron.
Statement #8 bluntly states that time spent performing 
alerts, including travel time, is equal among the three ILCS 
squadrons. The 12th SMS registered a median score of 2 for this 
statement, indicating their slight disagreement. The 490th SMS 
on the other hand registered extremely strong resentment to this 
comment with a minimal standard deviation around the mean score 
of 1.03. The close and far sites of the 10th both strongly 
disagreed. Statement #9 is a lead-in statement which triggered 
a series of other responses from those who felt that they spend 
more time performing alert duties (including travel time) than 
the rest of the ILCS squadrons. The 12th SMS responded with a 
resounding no to this statement. The 490th SMS unanimously 
agreed that they do indeed spend more time on alert and on the 
road than any other squadron. The 10th was split on this issue 
probably due to the fact that they perceived the 490th SMS to be 
carrying the heaviest alert loads.
Since the close sites mainly responded no to statement #9, 
any responses to questions #10 through #14 will be based on only 
a very few cases. Because of this fact, only responses from far 
sites have been examined for this series of statements. The 
490th SMS was somewhat reluctant in saying that the extra alert
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time they experienced actually affected their job performance, 
as they hovered with a mean score of 3.66 for question #12. The
far sites in the 10th actually slightly disagreed with this 
concept. Thus we cannot say that far sites feel their job 
performance is suffering because of their alert loads. However 
the 490th SMS does feel that the present alert load definitely 
affects their family and social life, and partially affects 
their attitude toward the Air Force, and their health and 
general well-being. The far sites in the 10th SMS could only 
say that their family lives were partially affected by heavy 
alert loads, other effects were not considered significant 
enough to show anything but indifference.
System Alternative Responses
Statement #15 through #23 on the survey concern each of the 
alternative scheduling systems which were presented earlier in 
this study. The statistics comparing responses between the 12th 
SMS and the 490th SMS for these series of statements are seen in 
Table 20. Table 21 draws a similar comparison of responses 
between the close and far sites of the 10th SMS respectively.
Statement #15 proposes that the status quo should be 
maintained in regards to the current scheduling system. While 
the 12th SMS showed indifference to this, the 490th and the far 
sites in the 10th all believed that changes must be made. Close 
sites in the 10th SMS slightly disagreed that the status quo
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TABLE 20
S E C T I O N  I I I  R E S P O N S E S  ( 1 2 T H  S M S / 4 9 0 T H  S M S )
** Descriptive Statistics
File; alert/ Alert Load Inequities Subset: C
1 2 t h  S M SXlS/NoChange X16/Helicopt X17/MiniBase XlS/FourCape X19/36HourAl 
X20/48HourAl X21/Weighted X22/IncrMann X23/EarlyPre X24/Choice
Var. Mean Std. Dev. Smallest Largest Median
X15 3.212121 1.452532 1 5 3X16 3.484849 1. 301951 1 5 4X17 2.333333 1. 406829 1 5 2X18 2.30303 1.286586 1 5 2X19 2.333333 1.554563 1 5 1X20 2.121212 1.340652 1 5 2X21 1.878788 1.218544 1 5 1
X22 2.909091 1.208399 1 5 3
X23 2. 181818 1.379641 1 8 1X24 4. 121212 3.079748 1 10 3
H= 33, Press ENTER to CONTINUE
»* Descriptive Statistics ** 
File : alert/ Alert Load Inequities Subset : D4 9 0 t h  S M S
Xi5/NoChange X16/Helicopt X17/MiniBase X18/FourCaps X19/36HourAl 
X20/48HourAl X21/Weighted X22/IncrMann X23/EarlyPre X24/Choice
Var. Mean Std. Dev. Smallest Largest
X15 1.78125 1.128355 1 5
X16 2.6875 1.306004 1 5
X17 1.84375 1.346666 1 5
X18 3 1.077632 1 5
X19 3.28125 1.570584 1 5
X20 2.90625 1.304072 1 5
X21 4.40625 1.042929 1 5
X22 4.46875 .9152604 1 5
X23 2. 75 1.64611 1 a
X24 6.9375 1.625155 1 10
Median
1
3
1
3
3. 5
3
5
5
2
7
N= 32, Press ENTER to CONTINUE
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TABLE 21
S E C T I O N  I I I  R E S P O N S E S  ( A , B , C / D , E )
** Descriptive Statistics *
File; alert/ Alert Load Inequities Subset; A
A . B . CX15/NoChange X16/Helicopt X17/MiniBase XlS/FourCaps X19/36HourAl 
X20/48HourAl X21/Weighted X22/IncrMann X23/EarlyPre X24/Choice
Var. Mean Std. Dev. Smallest Largest Median
X15 2.235294 1.032558 1 5 2X16 3.647059 1.366619 1 5 4X17 2.058824 1.297622 1 5 2X18 2.352941 1.497547 1 5 2X19 2.235294 1.393261 1 5 2X20 2.470588 1.545867 1 5 2X21 3.529412 1.328422 1 5 4X22 3.941177 1.297622 1 5 4X23 2.294118 1.531531 1 8 2X24 5.058824 3.111884 1 10 6
N= 17, Press ENTER to CONTINUE
** Descriptive Statistics » *
File; alert/ Alert Load Inequities Subset ; B
D . EX15/NoChange XIG/Helicopt X17/MiniBase X18/FourCaps X19/36HourAl 
X20/48HourAl X21/Weighted X22/IncrMann X23/EarlyPre X24/Choice
Var. Mean Std. Dev. Smallest Largest
X15 1.941176 1.39062 1 5
X16 2.764706 1.147247 1 5
X17 1.823529 1.333946 1 5
X18 2-82353 1.236694 1 5
X19 2.588236 1.371989 1 5
X20 2.882353 1.317306 1 5
X21 3.294118 1.358525 1 5
X22 4.352941 1.057188 1 5
X23 2.588236 1.734172 1 8
X24 6 2.936835 1 10
Median
1
3
1
3
3
3
3
5
2
7
N= 17, Press ENTER to CONTINUE
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should be maintained. Statement #16 suggests that helicopter 
transport should be used on a daily basis in lieu of the current 
system. The 12th SMS agreed with this suggestion while all 
other far sites tended to disagree or be indifferent to the 
approach. This response on the part of the far sites could be 
due to the fact that vehicles have been known to beat 
helicopters home from site, on occasion, even from far sites. 
Helicopter reliability, due to weather deviations, could also be 
a reason for the slightly negative reactions.
Statement #17 proposes the concept of a mini-base set up in 
the Lewistown area. The far sites expressed even stronger 
opposition than the near sites to this suggestion. Apparently 
crews assigned to distant sites feel more strongly that either 
this concept would remove themselves and their families too far 
from the "mainstream" of base life or that cost benefits would 
be negative. The four capsule squadron, as suggested in 
statement #18 received slight opposition from close sites and 
general indifference at the far sites. This may suggest that 
crews assigned to far sites might agree with the idea but can 
not see how the benefits will compensate themselves for their 
present alert loads. It is likely that they sense a manning cut 
would soon follow such an action. Some comments on the surveys 
indicated that this option would face serious political 
constraints as well.
Statement #19 advocates a return to the "old" 36 hour alert 
system using 12 hour rotations. The far sites were somewhat
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indifferent to this concept while slightly agreeing at times. 
There seemed to be some major differences of opinion on this 
approach at the far sites, as exhibited by higher than normal 
standard deviations. The closer sites seemed to slightly 
disagree with this concept, showing perhaps some fear that their 
free time might be jeopardized under this system. The 48 hour 
alert concept introduced in statement #20 seemed once again to 
arouse disapproval at the closer sites while far sites remained 
somewhat indifferent and undecided.
The weighted point equalization method suggested in 
statement #21 was soundly rejected by the 12th SMS as a median 
score of 1 was obtained. The close and far sites in the 10th 
slightly agreed with this idea however. Perhaps since their 
squadron is actually a model or equalization (having both close 
and far sites), they could more readily agree to the concept.
The 490th SMS had no problem in strongly agreeing with this 
equalization method, exhibiting a mean score of 4.4 and a median 
score of 5. Statement #22 proposed a manning increase at 
distant sites as a form of alert compensation. While the 12th 
SMS remained indifferent to this approach, the close sites in 
the 10th slightly agreed and all the far sites resoundingly 
supported this idea with the lowest standard deviation noted for 
any of the alternatives. The idea of an earlier pre-departure 
briefing, as presented in statement #23, was met with strong 
disfavor by the 12th SMS and with slight disfavor elsewhere. 
Apparently, both close and distant sites do not see this option
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as one which would do anything concrete to compensate for 
inequitable work loads.
Statement #24 request the respondent to pick the
alternative of his choice. The 12th SMS was split between
maintaining the status quo and increasing helicopter usage. A 
histogram representing the 12th SMS preferences can be seen in 
Table 22. Table 23 shows that the 490th SMS voted for the 
weighted point system followed closely by the increased manning 
suggestion. The close sites in the 10th SMS primarily agreed 
with increasing the manning followed by the increased use of 
helicopters. These preferences are shown in Table 24. Table 25
indicates that the far sites in the 10th SMS align themselves
with the feelings of the 490th SMS, feeling that the weighted 
point system was the best choice, followed by an increase in 
manning. Finally, Table 26 includes all of the data regardless 
of subset definitions. This histogram indicates an overall tie 
for the best choice between the weighted point system and 
increased manning.
Qther_Attitude_ResBgnses
Statement #25 through #30 comment on a variety of other 
attitudes expressed concerning the current alert scheduling 
system. The descriptive statistics comparing responses between 
the 12th SMS and the 490th SMS for these statements are located 
in Table 27. Likewise, Table 28 draws a similar comparison of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TABLE 27
S E C T I O N  I V  R E S P O N S E S  ( 1 2 T H  S M S / 4 9 0 T H  S M S )
»* Descriptive Statistics **
File; alert/ Alert Load Inequities Subset: C
1 2 t h  S M S
X25/AL vs DR X26/EightAL X27/WorkAver X28/ShopFar 
X30/Leave X29/Shop3AL
Var. Mean Std. Dev. Smallest Largest Median
X25 3.909091 1.182255 1 5 4
X26 3.787879 1.243925 1 5 4
X27 3. 242424 .9024378 1 5 3
X28 3.666667 .7359803 1 5 4
X29 3.545455 .7537785 1 5 4
X30 4.151515 .7550338 3 5 4
N= 33, Press ENTER to CONTINUE
Descriptive Statistics *♦
File; alert/ Alert Load Inequities Subset; D4 9 0 t h  S M S
X25/AL vs DR X26/EightAL X27/WorkAver X28/ShopFar X29/Shop3AL 
X30/Leave
Var. Mean Std. Dev. Smallest Largest Median
X25 2.90625 1.146084 1 5 3
X26 3.8125 1.354503 1 5 4
X27 4.40625 .665237 1 5 4. 5
X28 4.34375 .6530018 1 5 4
X29 3. 875 .7513429 1 5 4
X30 4.34375 .7452809 
N= 32, Press
3 5 
ENTER to CONTINUE
4, 5
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TABLE 28
SECTION IV RESPONSES (A,B,C/D,E)
*» Descriptive Statistics **
File; alert/ Alert Load Inequities Subset; A
A B CX25/AL vs DR X26/EightAL X27/WorkAver X28/ShopFar ' X29/Shop3AL X30/Leave
Var. Mean Std. Dev
X25 3.647059 1.114741X26 4.411765 1.064121X27 3.941177 1.028991X2S 4.058824 .966345X29 3.705882 1.263166X30 4.588236 .7122871
Smallest Largest Median
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5
N= 17, Press ENTER to CONTINUE 
* * Descriptive Statistics * »
File : alert/ Alert Load Inequities
X25/AL vs DR X26/EightAL X27/WorkAver X28/ShopFar 
X30/Leave
4
5 
4 
4
4
5
Subset ; BD.E
X29/Shop3AL
Var. Mean Std. Dev
X25 2.941177 1.088037
X26 3. 941177 1. 028991
X27 4.176471 .8828428
X28 3. 705882 1.358525
X29 3. 235294 1.43742
X30 4. 352941 .8617698
Smallest Largest Median
5
5
5
5
5
5
fl- 17  ̂ Press ENTER to CONTINUE
3
4 
4 
4
4
5
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responses between the close and far sites in the 10th SMS 
respectively.
Statement #25 asserts that alerts themselves have more of 
an effect on one's general health and well-being than does 
driving distances. The 12th SMS slightly agrees while the 490th 
SMS was fairly indifferent to this assumption. A similar 
response was noted in the 10th SMS as well. Statement #26 
states that eight alerts a month is too much regardless of the 
driving time involved. Everyone tended to agree with this 
statement with a particularly vigorous and unexplained agreement 
coming from the close sites in the 10th SMS. Statement #27 
urges that a workweek average for crew members should be 
computed each month to be used as a compensation tool for those 
with burdensome schedules. The 12th SMS was indifferent to this 
idea as everyone else agreed with the concept. The 490th SMS 
strongly supported this initiative. Sites both near and far 
agreed that evaluator and instructor crews should attempt to 
perform alert duties at far sites to offer compensation to those 
crews assigned at these remote locations. As well, almost 
everyone agreed that these select crews should be assigned three 
alert actions per month instead of two. Finally, the responses 
from statement #30 indicate that the entire crew force feels 
that they have been penalized for taking leave by being assigned 
an inordinate number of alert actions upon their return to duty.
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION
Each of the proposed alternatives has now been scrutinized 
in two separate domains. Every option was evaluated against 
four main bodies of constraints to include: political, economic, 
psychological, as well as command and local scheduling 
constraints. In addition, a detailed survey has examined crew 
member attitudes toward each option presented. It is only 
logical that both of these areas, constraints and opinion, be 
used Judiciously to narrow down the choice for the decision 
maker. This chapter will accomplish this function using a case 
by case process of elimination.
The idea of maintaining the status quo does not attempt to 
solve the problem of inequitable alert loads. The only real 
advantage to this option is that it violates no constraints.
The survey showed that crew members assigned to squadrons with 
distant sites all agreed that some type of improvement should be 
attempted. Therefore, the status quo alternative should be 
eliminated. Increasing the use of helicopters for crew 
transport was shown to violate previously established economic 
constraints in terms of both initial costs and continuing
operations and maintenance. The survey exhibited responses of
101
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disfavor and indifference for this particular option, except in 
the 12th SMS where it was agreeable to most. The mini-base 
concept was seen as seriously violating established economic 
constraints due to enormous set up costs. This option might 
have been practical if implemented in conjunction with a new 
weapon system at Malmstrom. In addition, crew members gave the 
idea low scores on the survey.
The four capsule approach would surely pass the economic 
barrier with substantial savings but the concept seems to falter 
in terms of current political constraints. Altering the weapon 
system to such an extent seems to violate the Minuteman concept 
of dispersed sites altogether, even though reactivation would be 
possible under advanced states of readiness. Weapon system 
safety is another political stumbling block for this approach. 
The survey displayed a slightly negative attitude toward this 
alternative, probably due to the fact that manning would be 
reduced and alert loads would remain unchanged. Therefore, the 
four capsule approach has also been eliminated.
The 36 hour alert concept would violate both economic and 
scheduling criteria by requiring a 33 percent increase in the 
size of the crew force. They survey demonstrated some 
discontent and indifference to this idea which would not really 
attempt to solve the alert load problem to begin with. The 48 
hour alert would provide some definite cost advantages but the 
psychological constraints of the Personnel Reliability Prograi 
would most likely prevent its implementation. Close sites
im
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
rejected the idea as far sites were relatively indifferent as a 
whole. Thus both the 36 and 48 hour alert models are discarded 
due to violations of established constraints and a lack of 
popular support.
The weighted point equalization plan does not propose any 
cost increases and therefore does not violate any economic 
constraints. It has tremendous support from the crew force as 
well, particularly in the 490th SMS. The only real problem li 
within scheduling criteria. The plan would virtually eliminate 
the goal of squadron integrity, much less flight integrity. It 
would be fairly difficult to manage unless delegated to the 
flight commander level. Unless the site integrity standards are 
relaxed at this wing, this concept will not be acceptable, 
despite its popular support. Most of the attitudes toward 
suggested improvement in terms of discriminate scheduling were 
highly praised by the crew force with the exception of the early 
pre-departure briefing. This was probably discarded because it 
simply offered no compensation in terms of alert load 
equalization.
Increasing manning at the far sites seemed to offer the 
best solution of all worlds; alert compensation for those crews 
assigned to distant sites without violating any of the 
predetermined constraints. This solution was extremely popular 
as well, except in the 12th SMS, where it met with 
indifference. Certainly this option should meet with less 
resistance than other plans simply because it is a modification
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to the present system and not an implementation of a totally new 
system altogether. This study recommends that the increased 
manning model be employed at the earliest opportunity. The 
implementation strategy involves gathering additional crews and 
introducing them to the sites needing additional manning « Since 
the wing is currently manned at 106 percent, there are about 8 
to 9 extra crew members that may be consolidated into the far 
site squadrons. The 10th SMS and the 490th SMS should receive 
the new crews. Based on the number of far sites in each of 
these squadrons, one crew (two crew members) should go the 10th 
SMS while three crews should be assigned to the 490th SMS. The 
new crews could immediately assume alert duties from currently 
assigned crews. This implementation strategy should be 
supported by employing other discriminate scheduling techniques 
as pointed out by the survey analysis. Workweek averages should 
be revised and used on a monthly basis to track those 
individuals who exceed predetermined limits. Evaluator and 
instructor crews should be scheduled for alert duty at far sites 
whenever possible and the possibility of three alert actions per 
month for these select crews should be explored further.
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CHAPTER IX 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The survey used in this study allowed the respondent to 
describe a proposed alternative scheduling system of his own 
choosing if those provided were not optimal in his view. Some 
of these write-in comments were just variations on proposed 
alternatives, others were considerably more. One individual 
liked the helicopter concept but only during the winter months. 
Another respondent went a little further by proposing that seven 
crew vehicles should be based in the Lewistown area (to include 
a vehicle for each of the 490th SMS sites, 001 and EDI). He 
then suggested that a helicopter drop off these crews at 
Lewistown using two aircraft. This would allow these crews a 
chance to avoid staggered changeovers which are a common problem 
with this type of transport. This plan and other novel ideas 
bear further research as to their feasibility.
Another respondent thought that the weighted point system 
would be more smoothly implemented if it were computed on a 
quarterly basis instead of monthly. One individual thought that 
the workweek average could be used as a tool to indicate which 
squadron deserved additional manning. In other words, a
comparative analysis between the squadrons would dictate who
1 0 5
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would receive new crew arrivals.
Another intriguing concept which deserves additional 
research is that of the rotational squadron. Within a four-year 
period one would switch an entire squadron's personnel to a 
different squadron. In other words, the 10th SMS crews would be 
assigned to the 10th SMS one year and to the 12th SMS the next, 
following up with an assignment to the 490th SMS in the year 
after. Another suggestion was to give each alert a point value 
(i.e. one point for line alerts, two points for flight commander 
alerts, and three points for instructors and evaluators). When 
an individual reached a 200 point total that person should be 
able to terminate his crew duty. This system could easily be 
adjusted in terms of mileage driven as well, so that far sites 
could accumulate higher point values. Research in these and 
other related areas would complement the work undertaken by this 
study in alternative scheduling systems.
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